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Human Service Organizations and the Production of Moral Categories 
Human service organizations as moral systems 
I conceptualize human service organizations as a set of organizations that work on 
people. They have an explicit mandate to transform them from a state that is viewed as socially 
undesirable, such as ill-health or lack of education, to a state that is viewed as socially more 
desirable. Therefore, a distinctive feature of these organizations is that they engage in moral 
work.' Because the clients are imbued with values, every action taken by the workers has a moral 
dimension to it. The workers not only provide some form of concrete services such as counseling 
a a family or determining eligibility for welfare. Invariably in their action they confer a valuation 
about the moral worth of their clients. The valuation has two dimensions -- external and internal. 
The external dimension places the client in a moral category of "deservingness." It signals the 
location of the client in a moral stratification system. The internal dimension involves the client's 
own self-assessment of her moral worth in response to the worker's valuation. It becomes 
incorporated in client's self-identity. 
The use of moral categories 
Moral categories are central to the work of HSOs because services and resources to 
clients must be rationed. Therefore, the allocation rules that these organizations develop 
represent a moral classification system in the sense that clients are categorized according to some 
criterion of deservingness or valuation of moral worth which determine access to services. In 
turn, the differential allocation of services and resources lends credence to these moral categories 
and thus leads to their reification. It is the connection between the moral categories and the 
allocation of resources that makes these categories so potent. Put differently, when workers make 
decisions about what clients get what services, when and how much, they engage in an appraisal 
of the moral stratification of their clients. When they allocate resources and services, the workers 
also reinforce or alter the moral capital of their clients. For example, the decision whether a 
single poor mother qualifies for public assistance is not merely a technical question of assessing 
her needs in relation to the available resources. It is also a moral assessment of her 
"deservingness," including judgement about her commitment to the work ethic and to family 
values (Handler and Hasenfeld, 1991). Moreover, her access to state benefits such as income 
support, skill training and childcare will affect her capacity to accumulate both social and moral 
capital. These are vital resources that will influence the mother's economic well being. 
The moral categorization of clients include assumptions about: a) the moral worth of the 
person; b) attribution of responsibility; c) amenability to change; d) desired end results; and e) 
view of the person as object vs. subject. These assumptions are clearly not mutually exclusive 
and affect each other. When a client is accorded high moral worth the staff are motivated to 
mobilize the necessary organizational resources to affirm such a status. In contrast, when a client 
is viewed as morally deficient she becomes "undeserving" and is subject to a moral test before 
gaining access to organizational resources. For example, mothers who become single parents 
because of the death of a working spouse are morally deserving of universal benefits (i.e., 
Survivor's Benefits). Mothers who become single parents because of desertion by their spouse 
are morally undeserving and can only apply to means-tested public assistance (Fraser, 1989). 
Attribution of responsibility signifies whether the clients themselves are morally responsible for 
their predicament or whether they are victims of circumstances beyond their control. This 
assumption, in turn, affects the degree to which the organization puts the onus on the clients to 
justify their claim for services. In the first instance, clients must often undergo 'repentance' or 
publicly profess their moral deficiencies to qualify for services. For example, applicants for 
general assistance are assumed to be responsible for their predicaments because of lack of a work 
ethic and must undergo a work test (i.e., participate in work activities) to obtain relief. In 
contrast, persons eligible for Unemployment Compensation are assumed to be victims of 
economic circumstances. Assumptions about amenability to change influence the degree to 
which the organization commits itself to bring about change in the client's circumstances. 
Students tracked into vocational versus academic tracks are assumed to lack the capacity to excel 
intellectually, and the school is less likely to invest in them (Oakes, 1995). Similarly, 
assumptions about the desired end results influence the service goals and objectives the 
organization. Schools that truly believe that developmentally disabled children can be educated 
to hnction in the 'normal society' commit themselves to finding effective educational 
technologies that can integrate the children into the regular classrooms (Handler, 1986). Other 
schools that only give lip service to the idea of main streaming are more likely to find reasons to 
segregate these children (Weatherley and Lipsky, 1977). Finally, whether the organization treats 
its clients as objects or subjects determines the extent to which clients will have a.voice in what 
is done to them. Organizations that treat their clients as subjects encourage them to become 
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active participants and to have a voice in the decisions about their course of service. In contrast, 
when clients are treated as objects, they are worked upon rather than with. 
Typification Systems as Rationalized Moral Categories 
The moral categorization of clients is rationalized and objectified through an officially 
sanctioned system of typification (Abbott 1988). It consists of the use of diagnostic schemes, 
treatment modalities and inferences of causality. An example might be the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders @SM) produced and sanctioned by the American 
Psychiatric Association. While these systems of typification are rationalized via legal 
authorizations and professional scientific knowledge they, nonetheless, have an inescapable 
moral dimension because they define and establish normative criteria to judge "good" or 
"normal" attributes. This can be noted, for example, in the evolution of DSM and the changes in 
the definition of "normal" and "abnormal" behavior (Kirk and Kutchins, 1992). When applied, 
these normative criteria invariably define the moral worth of the person. Educational tests that 
classify students into ability tracks implicitly place greater moral value on certain cognitive 
capacities over others. As a results students that are endowed with the "desirable" cognitive 
attributes are accorded.higher moral worth and greater access to desirable educational resources. 
The Institutional Perspective 
Organizations that engage in moral work are institutionalized organizationspar 
excellence. They obtain their legitimacy by affirming and reinforcing institutionalized moral 
values in their environment. Following Meyer and Rowan ( 1977), we can argue that a key 
structural feature of.these organizations is the myths and ceremonies that emanate from and. 
reinforce institutionalized moral rules. These myths and ceremonies are particularly manifested 
in the client typification system. 
Nonetheless, when applied to human service organizations and the structure of their 
work, the new institutional perspective has several limitations. First, there is a de-emphasis of the 
moral dimensions of institutional rules. Rather, "not norms and values but taken-for-granted 
scripts, rules, and classifications are the stuff of which institutions are made" (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991, p. 15). I would argue that human service organizations cannot be understood 
without explicit reference to the moral systems in which they are embedded. Second, the 
dichotomy between formal structure and technology assumes that the latter is buffered from 
institutional rules by the former. I propose that in human service organizations the service 
technologies themselves are equally imbued with moral assumptions and cannot be understood 
without them. Third, when the emphasis shifts to the moral dimension, human service 
organization must often contend with conflicting and contentious moral rules. These, in turn, 
will be reflected in multiple and conflicting service technologies (e.g., Strauss, 1985). Therefore, 
the processes of structural decoupling are less an attempt to buffer the technology from the 
required myths and ceremonies, but more of an effort to accommodate within the organization 
multiple and conflicting moral requirements. Third, moral work is highly contextualized, 
reflecting the particular cultural, political and economic exigencies of the local community in 
which such work takes place. Therefore, human service organizations, even within the same 
sector, may experience considerable more structural diversity and less isomorphism than the 
theory suggests. Finally, the new institutional perspective tends to be too deterministic by 
understating the role of agency (DiMaggio, 1988). Yet, as I will point out, agents in 
organizations doing moral work are active interpreters and promoters of moral values, not the 
least of which their own. In addition, the organizations themselves undertake moral 
entrepreneurship -- mobilizing constituencies and developing network relations that reinforce 
and institutionalize their own moral beliefs (Zucker, 1988). This is exemplified by the feminist 
health centers studied by Hyde (1992). 
The Production of Moral Categories: Institutional Forces. 
Undoubtedly, the moral categories used and reified by HSOs emanate primarily from 
politically powefil interest groups that advance and enforce such categories via social policies 
sanctioned by. the state. They pursue the institutionalization of their moral agenda to legitimate 
their ideological, political and economic positions. A good example is the recently enacted 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. It contains such 
explicit moral rules as "Marriage is the foundation of a successhl society. Marriage is an 
essential institution of a successfbl society that promotes the interests of children. Promotion of 
responsible fatherhood and motherhood is integral to successhl child rearing and the well-being 
of children."" To promote these moral edicts, the legislators set certain programmatic 
requirements and restrictions on welfare to work programs, such as requiring teen mothers to live 
with their parents and encourage them to get married. By controlling key resources needed by 
HSOs, these interest groups make the allocation of the resources contingent on embedding their 
moral assumptions in the organizations' service technologies and the production of myth and 
ceremonies. Consequently, the encounters between clients and workers as structured by the 
service technologies in order to reproduce these dominant moral categories. 
These broad moral edicts get their own particular spin in the local community. When 
moral work is conflictual and ambiguous, especially regarding the control and management of 
deviance, upper level politicians delegate considerable discretion to the local level. In doing so, 
they buffer themselves from the controversies that surround the symbols they espouse, and they 
need not be concerned with the difficult issues of implementing the programs the must do the 
moral work. Local officials, in turn, design the programs in response to the local political 
economies and the moral assumptions that justify them (Hasenfeld, 1991). Local school systems 
and welfare departments are prime examples. Both tend to reflect dominant moral assumptions in 
the local community in which they are embedded and these are expressed in how poor single 
mothers are treated or what textbooks schools adopt. 
Organizations as Moral Entrepreneurs 
The organization itself is a third source of moral rules and categories through its own 
entrepreneurship. The feminist health centers studied by Hyde (1992) pursued and instituted 
new moral rules in their services and internal structure based on a feminist ideology. The 
ideology was expressed in service goals that aimed to give women control over their own health 
through self-help and participation in social action, and in an internal structure that was based on 
collective governance. Similarly, the Madison School District, in contrast to other schools, 
assumed that the disabled children were morally worthy, amenable to change, and could be 
effectively main streamed. It developed an organizational ideology that saw the parents are part 
of the solution and sought actively to involve them in the curricular decisions about their 
children. It gave parents knowledge and promoted their active participation, and assigned them 
advocates who negotiated on their behalf with school officials (Handler, 1986). 
Finally, organizations can form coalitions and join other interest groups that share their 
moral systems, in order to influence social legislation and institutionalize their moral systems. 
When they are successhl, their organizational practices also gain prominence through normative 
and mimetic processes. The Alliance for the Mentally I11 is such an example.'It has successfblly 
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challenged dominant conceptions that pathological intra-family interactions are the cause of 
schizophrenia. It has replaced them with an alternative conception of physiological causes, thus 
exonerating the parents from a moral responsibility for the illness of their children (Sommer, 
1990) 
Organizations also change their own moral rules when they need to rationalize their 
adaptive strategies in the face of a changing environment. The classical study by Scott (1969) of 
agencies for the blind shows how sheltered workshops changed their moral assumptions fiom 
integrating the blind into the regular labor market to protecting them from such a market. The 
change was a result of the pressures on the workshops to maintain their fiscal viability and thus 
keep the more productive and able blind persons. In other words, moral assumptions not only 
enact new organizational forms and practices, but they are used to justify forms and practices 
that arise out of the need to adapt to external political and economic forces. 
It is important to emphasize, again, that organizational practices produce moral 
consequences by the ways clients are treated and services delivered. Although these practices 
might be justified on the basis of technical rationality or efficiency, they implicitly generate and 
reinforce moral conceptions about their clients. These conceptions, of course, may be 
incompatible with publicly espoused belief systems. Yet, these implicit conceptions have greater 
, currency in guiding the behavior of the staff and, therefore, are institutionalized in the 
organizational form and practice. Being mutually reinforcing, over time forms and assumptions 
reproduce themselves. 
The Role of Agency 
Moral categories are also produced through the interaction of workers with their clients. 
Inevitably, in organizations that work on people, staff exercises considerable discretion. The 
organization is dependent on them to interpret the rules and apply them to the specific cases. No 
matter how many rules the organization promulgates, it is left to the line staff to gather and 
interpret the information about their clients (Lipsky, 1980). They can always manipulate the 
information and find rules or organizationally sanctioned rationales to justify their actions. 
Moreover, because the service technologies are often indeterminate, ambiguous and lack clear 
cause-effect relations, workers must develop their own set of rules, paradigms and practices to 
guide their work. I call these "practice ideologies. " They shared personal and professional belief 
systems as well as shared work experiences. They enable the workers to make sense of their 
work. In other words, considerable sensemaking -- "an effort to tie beliefs and actions more 
closely together" (Weick, 1995: 135) occurs in human service organizations. Workers do so by . 
developing typification schemas in order to justify the actions they have taken. 
Equally important, workers constantly encounter contingencies and constraints in their 
work that require them to modify prescribed practices. For example, when welfare-to-work 
programs shifted to mandatory job search, the workers constructed their own conception of the 
"welfare contract" which "excluded a client right to help in job-finding and denied a state 
obligation to assure that decent job opportunities existed or could be found(Brodkin, 1997). 
During assessment of the client needs, the workers were motivated to fit the client into available 
slots and, therefore, ignored information about service needs that they could not respond. Not 
infrequently, caseworkers sent clients to jobsearches even though they did not meet the required 
level of education or literacy proficiency. Because job search was limited by federal regulations 
to eight weeks per year, the caseworkers needed other alternatives to keep their clients in this 
low cost activity. They created a new service category called "job readiness," and when it proved 
to consume too much time, they resorted to deferrals. 
In other words, by creating own practice ideologies to cope with the exigencies of their 
work situation, the workers in effect modify the service technology and institutionalize their own 
moral schemas in the organizational processes. In this sense, both agency and structure interact 
to produce moral categories. 
Using a structuration perspective (Giddens, 1984, Sewell, 1992), we can say that the 
service technologies shape the practices of the workers, but the practices of the workers 
constitute and reproduce the service technologies. In particular, agents are not only able to 
observe and understand what they are doing, but they can also adjust their observation rules. 
Therefore, workers knowing that their decisions about their clients are affected by their own 
moral beliefs and conceptions of the nature of their work can modify such decisions. When they 
do so they can affect change in the social structure, i.e., the service technology. Similarly, 
Orlikowski (1992) showed how technology can be conceptualized both as being socially 
constructed by members of the organization and, once constructed, as a reified and objectified 
structure that constrains their behavior. In my own research on welfare-to-work programs 
(Hasenfeld and Weaver, 1996), I found that workers incorporated their own moral conceptions 
about welfare dependency and the work ethic in how they made decisions about them: Moreover, 
workers also develop practices that enable them to cope with and manage the particular 
exigencies they encounter, such as the amount of time available to them, the size of their 
caseload, and the resources available to them. They typify their clients and make service 
decisions that take into account these factors. They rationalize their actions by morally 
constructing their clients. These personal belief systems and the moral rationalizations are shared 
among groups of staff because they have similar background, training and experiences, they face 
the same work exigencies, and they communicate with each other about their work situation. It 
is through this process of sharing that personal moral schemas becomes institutionalized in 
organizational practices (Sand fort, 1999). 
Clients as Agents 
Human service workers are not the only agents that affect structure. Clients through their 
interactions with workers also influence the production of moral categories. Clients are generally 
aware of the various categories used to typify them, and that these categories result in 
differential access to organizational resources and services. Through their transactions with the 
workers, clients attempt to negotiate as favorable a "type" (i.e., diagnostic category) as they can 
in order to gain access to desirable services and resources. They do so by mobilizing their own 
power resources including social and moral capital. The workers, cognizant of these power 
resources, respond in ways that minimize their transaction costs with the clients, ensure 
reasonable management of their work and achieve what they consider desirable outcomes. 
Therefore, their typification processes take into account the different power resources clients 
bring to the encounters. The workers rationalize their decisions by applying moral categories that 
justify their actions. These decisions may indeed be at variants with the formal rules specified in 
the service technology since these rules are less sensitive to the power resources clients bring to 
the encounters. Nonetheless, over time these typification practices become institutionalized in 
the organization. That is, the workers incorporate assessments of the power resources of the 
clients into their decision making and typification schemas. It is in this sense that HSOs tend to 
affirm the moral capital that clients bring with them to the organization. For example, studies of 
tracking of high school students have shown that socio-economic status, ethnicity and gender of 
the students play an important role in the decisions teachers make which consequently tend to 
reproduce class, ethnicity and gender inequalities (e.g., Gaskell, 1985). Equally important, 
students who opt out of academic track tend to internalize the very moral conceptions that 
justified their choice -- e.g., not being smart enough, accepting a conventional gender role in the 
labor market. Similarly, patient-physician interactions are also influenced by the cultural 
resources both bring into the encounters (Waitzkin, 1985, 1991). Communications that are more 
effective occur when both physicians and patients come fiom higher socio-economic 
backgrounds, and the longer they have known each other. For patients, effective communication 
with their physicians is an important signal of their own moral worth. 
Changing Typification Systems 
The production and reproduction of moral categories as expressed in the organizational 
typification schemas are likely to become stable overtime as they become institutionalized in the 
organizational practices. Nonetheless, there are several forces that can bring about change in 
both the categories and the practices that support them. Following Sewell (1992), we can identi@ 
several such forces. First, HSOs operate in an environment, both external and internal, that is 
characterized by multiple and diverse moral schemes. Moreover, within the organization there 
are spheres of activities or niches that embody particular moral schemas. Consequently, both 
organizations and agents can call upon different moral schemes to justify new worker-client 
relations and practices. This has certainly been the case in the transformation of welfare 
departments (Hasenfeld, forthcoming). Second, moral schemas can be transferred fiom one 
organizational setting to another. The spread of the "home-builder" model throughout the child 
welfare system is such an example. The model assumes that parental caring of the child, no 
matter how deficient parents may be in parenting skills is morally superior to placing the child in 
surrogate care. Third, organizational practices and service technologies can be transferred to 
other settings generating with them alternative moral categories. For example, collectivist 
organizational structures may be adopted in several different settings including alternative 
schools, feminist health centers and shelters for battered women. These structures are coupled 
with moral conceptions of the clients that are quite different than those found .in conventionally 
organized human services. Finally, as the example of the Alliance for the Mentally I11 indicates, 
groups can mobilize and join with others to generate new moral capital, and they use such capital 
to influence organizational practices that they find morally objectionable. 
Conclusion 
I have tried to show that in order to understand human service organizations, it is 
important to focus on their moral work. It is the moral categories that these organizations adopt 
which produce their distinctive structures and practices. At the same time, it is these structures 
and practices that shape the nature of the moral work thus producing and reproducing moral 
categories. 
I use the term "human service organization" in a more narrow sense, referring to those 
organizations that focus on classifying and changing human behavior. 
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